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Background: Informal payments limit equitable access to healthcare. 
Despite being a common phenomenon, there is a need for an in-
depth analysis of informal charging practices in the Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) context. We conducted a systematic literature review to 
synthesize existing evidence on the prevalence, characteristics, 
associated factors, and impact of informal payments in SSA. 
Methods: We searched for literature on PubMed, African Index 
Medicus, Directory of Open Access Journals, and Google Scholar 
databases and relevant organizational websites. We included 
empirical studies on informal payments conducted in SSA regardless 
of the study design and year of publication and excluded reviews, 
editorials, and conference presentations. Framework analysis was 
conducted, and the review findings were synthesized. 
Results: A total of 1700 articles were retrieved, of which 23 were 
included in the review. Several studies ranging from large-scale 
nationally representative surveys to in-depth qualitative studies have 
shown that informal payments are prevalent in SSA regardless of the 
health service, facility level, and sector. Informal payments were 
initiated mostly by health workers compared to patients and they 
were largely made in cash rather than in kind. Patients made informal 
payments to access services, skip queues, receive higher quality of 
care, and express gratitude. The poor and people who were unaware 
of service charges, were more likely to pay informally. Supply-side 
factors associated with informal payments included low and irregular 
health worker salaries, weak accountability mechanisms, and 
perceptions of widespread corruption in the public sector. Informal 
payments limited access especially among the poor and the inability 
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to pay was associated with delayed or forgone care and provision of 
lower-quality care. 
Conclusions: Addressing informal payments in SSA requires a 
multifaceted approach. Potential strategies include enhancing patient 
awareness of service fees, revisiting health worker incentives, 
strengthening accountability mechanisms, and increasing 
government spending on health.
Keywords 
Informal payments, health, Sub-Saharan Africa, review
 
This article is included in the KEMRI | Wellcome 
Trust gateway.
 
Page 2 of 14
Wellcome Open Research 2021, 6:297 Last updated: 21 NOV 2021
Introduction
The health financing gap in low and middle-income countries 
(LMICs) persists1. LMICs accounted for only 20% of the glo-
bal spending on health in 2016 despite being home to over 
80% of the world’s population and bearing the greatest disease 
burden1. The low government spending in LMICs contributes 
to out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) becoming a major source of 
health financing2,3, accounting for almost half of the total health 
expenditure4,5. OOPs are payments made directly to healthcare 
providers by individuals at the point of care and this excludes 
prepayment mechanisms such as health insurance or taxes3. 
OOPs, represent direct costs of care associated with disease 
management6,7 and they can be officially stipulated fees 
and sometimes unofficial or what is referred to as informal 
payments2.
Informal payment can be defined as, “a direct contribution, 
which is made in addition to any contribution determined by the 
terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind, by patients or others 
acting on their behalf, to health care providers for services that 
the patients are entitled to”8. Some of the difficulties associ-
ated with studying informal payments include being deemed 
illegal in some countries thus making them a sensitive research 
topic9,10. This is compounded by the fact that some patients 
are unable to differentiate between official and unofficial 
fees9,10, while others refuse to respond to questions on informal 
payments9,10. All these factors make it challenging to estimate 
the magnitude and frequency of informal payments9.
Despite the challenges of measuring informal payments, evi-
dence shows that they are a common phenomenon in many 
countries9,10. They comprise a significant share of OOPs, 
accounting for 10% to 45% of total OOPs for healthcare in 
low-income countries10,11. Informal payments have also been 
reported to account for a substantial proportion of health financ-
ing resources in countries in transition10. They have been argued 
to impede healthcare reforms9,11, and reduce the efficiency 
and quality of care9,12. They also limit access to care especially 
among the poorest and can result in catastrophic healthcare 
expenditure that pushes households into poverty10,13. The occur-
rence of informal payments has been linked to various factors. 
On the supply side, informal payments have been associated with 
inadequate funding of the health sector9, limited transparency 
and accountability10,14, and low/irregular remuneration of staff10,15. 
On the demand side, patients pay informally to access care16,17, 
jump queues18, and receive better quality services17,19. Contex-
tual factors such as perceptions of high levels of corruption in 
the public sector14, distrust in public institutions10,11, and norms of 
gift-giving also influence informal payments10,14.
Informal payments are common in almost all African 
countries13. The 2016/18 Afrobarometer survey - a nationally 
representative survey that provides data on citizens’ experiences 
and perceptions of corruption across African countries - showed 
that more than one in four people who sought public serv-
ices such as health services and education paid a bribe. This 
amounted to approximately 130 million people in 35 African 
countries20. The nature and level of informal payments can be 
quite specific to the health system, socio-cultural, economic, 
and political context. While several reviews have sought to syn-
thesize evidence on informal payments10,12,21, none provide a 
comprehensive review of informal payment practices in the 
SSA context.
This systematic literature review aimed to synthesize the exist-
ing evidence on the prevalence, characteristics, reasons, asso-
ciated factors, and the impact of informal payments for 
healthcare in SSA. Findings from this review may help 
policymakers to gain a better understanding of informal pay-
ments and point to a range of factors they could address when 
developing interventions to curb informal payments. This is 
crucial as many SSA countries implement strategies to enhance 
financial risk protection as they progress towards attaining 
universal health coverage (UHC). This article is reported in 
line with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines22.
Methods
Search strategy
To identify relevant literature, we searched PubMed, African 
Index Medicus, Directory of Open Access Journals, and Google 
Scholar databases. The search terms were developed with ref-
erence to the search strategies used in recent literature reviews 
on informal payments for healthcare10,12,21. The main search term 
was “informal payment/fee/charge/expenditure” and its syno-
nyms, that is, unofficial, illegal, illicit, envelope, under-the-table, 
under-the-counter, and solicited payments/fee/charge/expendi-
ture, or bribe or corruption. These terms were combined with 
“health” and the list of SSA countries where applicable. The 
databases were last searched in August 2021. The search 
strategies for each database can be found as extended data22.
Bibliographies of included articles were also searched to iden-
tify any relevant articles. Additionally, grey literature was 
searched for using free text searches on Google and websites of 
organizations that publish on various aspects of corruption in 
the health sector such as Transparency International, World 
Bank, World Health Organization, United Nations Development 
Fund, and Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab.
Eligibility criteria
The inclusion criteria were any empirical studies on informal 
payments conducted in SSA, regardless of the study design, 
published in any year, and in the English language. The exclu-
sion criteria entailed reviews, editorials, and conference pres-
entations. EK screened the articles at all levels: title, abstract 
and full text. Articles selected for inclusion in the review were 
discussed and agreed upon in consultation with the co-authors.
Quality appraisal of included studies
The quality of qualitative studies was appraised using the criti-
cal appraisal skills program (CASP) checklist for qualitative 
research23; while the quality of quantitative studies was assessed 
using the appraisal tool for cross-sectional studies (AXIS)24. 
Mixed methods studies were appraised using both appraisal 
tools.
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Data extraction and analysis
Data were extracted using tables in Microsoft Excel version 
16 and this entailed general study characteristics (Table 1) and 
findings. Due to the variation in approaches to measuring the 
prevalence of informal payments across countries, a meta- 
analysis of quantitative data was not appropriate. We, there-
fore, conducted a narrative synthesis of the findings, exploring 
similarities and differences across the studies and contexts25. 
A modified framework analysis approach was conducted for 
qualitative studies. This entailed familiarisation with the data, 
identification of themes, indexing data based on the themes, 
charting the data for comparisons, interpreting the data while 
exploring for relationships between concepts26.
Results
Search results
The literature search retrieved a total of 1700 articles which 
were exported into Endnote X7. Articles were screened and 
excluded by title, abstract, and full text respectively. Articles 
excluded after full text review focused on other forms of 
corruption other than informal payments27–29, or informal pay-
ments were combined with other payments30. Overall, 23 arti-
cles were included in this review; 20 peer-reviewed articles 
and three grey literature. Figure 1 illustrates the study selection 
process.
Study characteristics
The majority of studies (n=12) were conducted in East Africa 
while Central Africa had the least number of studies (n=4) 
(Table 1). Three of the studies were conducted in multiple 
countries; one study used data from round 3 and 5 of the Afroba-
rometer survey conducted in 18 and 33 countries, respectively13, 
while the second study reported findings from rounds 6 and 7 
of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in 36 and 35 countries, 
respectively20. The third multi-country study was conducted in 
seven countries of which two were from Africa (Uganda and 
Table 1. General description of studies included in the review
Category Sub-category No. Study reference
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South Africa)31. Most studies (n=7) were conducted between 
2011 and 2015. Five studies used mixed methods, eleven were 
quantitative, and seven were qualitative. The studies were con-
ducted with a diverse group of participants with the major-
ity being healthcare workers, patients, and households. Most 
studies assessed informal payments for health services in gen-
eral while seven studies looked at informal payments for spe-
cific services, that is, maternal and child health services32–35, 
emergency services50, malaria treatment36, and HIV services37.
Prevalence of informal payments in SSA
Informal payments are a common phenomenon across East, 
West, Central, and Southern Africa but there was a notable 
variation in the prevalence across these regions (Table 2).
Prevalence from Afrobarometer studies. The most compre-
hensive data comes from a series of Afrobarometer surveys13,20. 
Round 7 (2016-18) conducted in 35 African countries showed 
that between 1% (Botswana) and 50% (Sierra Leone) of survey 
Figure 1. Study selection process adapted from the PRISMA 2009 flow diagram52.
Page 5 of 14
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Page 6 of 14
Wellcome Open Research 2021, 6:297 Last updated: 21 NOV 2021
respondents had given a gift/paid a bribe/done a favor to get 
services at a public health center or clinic in the 12 months pre-
ceding the survey. Southern Africa countries accounted for 
more than half (8/15) of the countries with a prevalence of 
informal payments that was less than 10% while most of the 
countries with a prevalence above 20% were from Western 
Africa (4/10) followed by Central Africa (3/10)20. Consecu-
tive rounds of the Afrobarometer survey showed indications 
of increasing prevalence over time in over half (18/30) of the 
SSA countries that took part in both round 6 (2014-15) and 
round 720. Similar trends were seen in perceptions of gen-
eral corruption in the public sector, with 55% of citizens sur-
veyed in 35 African countries in round 7 feeling that corruption 
was getting worse.
Prevalence from other studies. Other cross-sectional studies 
also demonstrated considerable variation in the prevalence of 
informal payments across 9 settings in terms of both the pro-
portion of patients reporting paying them and the proportion 
of health workers reporting receipt (Table 2).
Characteristics of informal payments
These entailed who initiated, the type, the timing, and the 
amount of informal payment paid.
Initiation of informal payments. Both healthcare work-
ers and patients initiated informal payments. Most stud-
ies where households or patients were interviewed reported 
that healthcare workers usually made demands for informal 
payments13,31,32,43,51. However, in Angola, some women offered 
informal payments to receive pregnancy and childbirth serv-
ices before demands were made hoping it would reduce the 
amount of money paid informally or to ensure in-kind payments 
would suffice33. A qualitative study conducted with healthcare 
workers in Tanzania also reported that informal payments 
were initiated more often by patients than providers because 
patients felt they needed to pay informally to receive quality 
services45.
Type of informal payments. Informal payments made in 
cash33,36–39,42,43,45 were more common than those made in 
kind33,38,46,47. Informal payments were charged in addition to 
other fees or as standalone fees43. For example, in Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), in-kind payments came often in form 
of food, soap, or fabric46, and in Sierra Leone, this comprised 
poultry, food, and charcoal47.
Timing of informal payments. Informal payments were made 
before32,50 or after service delivery33,42,50. For example, rela-
tives of patients seeking emergency services in Niger reported 
making informal payments before service provision follow-
ing demands from healthcare workers and after service provi-
sion as a sign of gratitude50. Some women in Angola reported 
that they would have preferred if the midwives delivered care 
first before asking for informal payments33.
The amount of informal payment. In total, eight studies assessed 
the amount of informal payments made. These studies were 
based on reports made by patients (n=2), households (n=2), 
healthcare workers (n=2), both household and patients (n=1), 
and the community (n=2)46,47. Regarding health worker reports, 
a survey conducted in DRC showed that they earned a mean 
income of $9 per month from informal payments46 while in 
Sierra Leone informal payments accounted for 5% of total rev-
enues for community health assistants and nurses ($11.8) and 
maternal and child health aides ($8.2) and 3% for community 
health officers ($9.42) per month47. In terms of patient reports, 
for example, informal payments were the second key con-
tributor to healthcare costs after transport costs in Tanzania 
accounting for 26.6% (1668 TZS (95% confidence interval 
[CI]: 931–2405)) of facility delivery costs at government 
facilities despite deliveries being exempt from user fees35.
Regarding the type of service, in Kenya for example, infor-
mal payments varied depending on the family planning method. 
Despite being officially free, informal payments were required, 
with higher amounts charged for long-acting methods34. 
Similarly, in Angola, informal payments were higher for cesar-
ean sections compared to normal deliveries, even though 
cesarean sections were exempt from user fees33.
Reasons for paying informal payments
Patients or their relatives made informal payments for treat-
ment to be initiated32,50, to receive both minor services such as 
bedpans42, injections51, or vaccinations33; and major services, such 
as surgeries32,42. Informal payments were also made to receive 
drugs that were supposed to be provided for free32–34,42,44,48,51, 
and to obtain medical record books and reports48. In Tanzania, 
some healthcare providers feigned stockouts of commodities 
and sought money from patients disguising to purchase 
the commodities from the private market on their behalf42. 
Informal payments were also made to enable patients to 
skip queues33,42,45 in an effort to get services more quickly33,45,51. 
Some patients made informal payments hoping to receive higher 
quality services in return32,43,45,51. In extreme cases, informal 
payments were made to enable patients to gain access to the 
health facility in Niger50, to obtain meals in Kenya51, and for 
family members to see the newborn baby for the first time in 
Benin32. Informal payments were also made to express gratitude 
in Angola, Tanzania, and Nigeria33,34,38,42,43. Qualitative studies 
showed that some healthcare workers in Nigeria and Tanzania 
perceived informal payments as an acceptable practice and as 
gifts to show appreciation for their work38,42.
Patient factors associated with informal payments
These comprised socioeconomic characteristics, health status, 
and social connections (Table 3).
Socioeconomic characteristics. People who were not aware 
of service entitlements and fees32,34,46, married people37, and 
those from male-headed households, which were probably less 
vulnerable than female-headed households31, were more likely 
to make informal payments while older people37 were less likely 
to pay informally. Regarding the amounts paid, the employed37, 
older patients, people traveling long distances to health 
facilities48, and those living in urban areas incurred higher 
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amounts of informal payments36,37. However, in Zambia patients 
who sought services at rural compared to urban primary health 
facilities paid higher amounts of informal payments48.
There were mixed findings on whether informal payments 
were more common among the rich or the poor. However, there 
seemed to be stronger evidence to support the latter. The preva-
lence was higher among the poor in almost all of the 33 coun-
tries that took part in round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey as 
evidenced by concentration indices ranging from -0.356 to 
0.09913. Nonetheless, two nationally representative surveys 
conducted in Uganda and Cameroon37,39 reported that the rich 
were more likely to pay informal payments than the poor. 
Data from round 3 of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in 
18 African countries also showed that healthcare workers 
demanded informal payments from the poor more than the rich 
(concentration indices ranging from -0.277 to 0.083)13. How-
ever, a quantitative study that used a rating scale ranging 
between 0 (not at all acceptable) and 10 (completely acceptable) 
showed that in Togo, physician requests for informal payments 
were perceived to be more acceptable when patients were 
wealthy (Median (M)=6.35) than when they were poor 
(M=1.73)40. Women taking part in focus group discussions 
(FGDs) in Angola reported that midwives did not solicit infor-
mal payments from the possibly well-off because they feared 
being reported33.
Regarding awareness, qualitative findings from Benin showed 
that pregnant women who were not aware of the cesarean sec-
tion user fee exemption policy were charged to access those 
services32. In DRC nurses were less likely to charge informal 
payments in communities where people were aware of user 
fees out of fear of being reprimanded46.
Health status. Patient survey data from Cameroon showed that 
the incidence and amount of informal payments were higher 
among people living with HIV (PLWHA) who reported not 
taking antiretroviral therapy (ART) (7.31%) and having 
“poor” health status (7.24%) with the latter possibly aimed at 
receiving more attention from healthcare workers compared to 
PLWHA who reported taking ART (1.57%) and having “good” 
health status (1.57%)37. Similarly, FGD participants in Angola 
reported that the amount of informal payments demanded 
increased remarkably if a pregnancy or labor changed from 
normal to complicated to the extent of forcing families to sell 
assets, borrow money, or beg to receive treatment33.
Social connections. Only one study reported on social con-
nections. This qualitative study conducted in Niger showed 
that in the absence of connections (relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances) at the health facility, patients or their relatives 
had to pay informal payments to various cadres and non-clinical 
staff to access services50.
Supply-side factors associated with informal payments
These entailed healthcare workers, health facility, and system- 
level characteristics (Table 4).
Healthcare worker characteristics. Healthcare workers of 
all cadres charged informal payments from specialists42,45,49, 
Table 3. Patient factors associated with informal payments





Marital status 1 37
Employment status 1 37
Income/wealth 7 13,33,37,39–41,46
Household head 1 31
Residence (rural/urban) 3 36,37,48
Distance to the health facility 1 48
Awareness of service entitlements and fees 3 32,34,46
Health status
Self-rated health 1 37
Change in health status e.g. during pregnancy/labor 1 33
Social connections
Absence of connections with health facility staff 1 50
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doctors42,45,49, nurses33,42,45, midwives32,33 to community health 
extension workers38, medical assistants42,45 and medical students50. 
In Sierra Leone, health facility managers/in-charges were almost 
three times more likely to receive gifts from patients com-
pared to other staff (odds ratio [OR]=2.731 (1.139) P<0.05)47. 
Similarly, in Tanzania, departmental heads were more likely 
to engage in informal charging (adjusted OR [AOR] 1.72 (CI: 
1.15–2.57) P<0.001)49. Doctors and specialists in Tanzania 
also had a higher likelihood of charging informal payments49 
and were reported to charge higher amounts compared to 
nurses or medical assistants42,45. In Uganda, higher amounts 
were paid if patients went to consult healthcare workers at their 
place of residence43. Informal payments were less likely among 
health workers who were older compared to younger ones46,49.
Informal social networks within and across cadres facilitated 
informal charging in some health facilities in Tanzania and 
Benin. Healthcare workers in Tanzania for example reported 
that informal payments were shared mainly across cadres. In 
some instances, there was overt cooperation across cadres to 
solicit informal payments42. Similarly, women who paid infor-
mally for cesarean section services in Benin reported that the 
midwives told them they would share the money with the other 
midwives, doctors, and other healthcare workers32. However, in 
Table 4. Supply-side factors associated with informal payments






Health facility manager/in-charge/head of department 2 47,49
Consultation venue i.e. health facility/healthcare workers residence 1 43
Salary (amount and timeliness) 8 32–34,37,40,45,49,50
Absence of allowances e.g. transport, risk 1 45
Health facility characteristics
Level of facility 5 34–36,47,48
Facility ownership (public/private for profit/private non-profit) 4 34,37,39,42
Facility location (rural/urban) 2 47,48
Waiting times 3 31,37,48
Task shifting 1 37
Poor working conditions 1 45
Number of healthcare workers 2 45,46
Lack of/stock out of essential drugs 2 13,48
Presence/absence of official charging policies 3 39,43,50
Accountability mechanisms for user fees 1 46
Supervision/oversight over health worker behavior 2 33,49
Poor health facility management 1 41
Engagement in informal charging/corruption by senior staff/facility managers 2 34,45
Action against corrupt practices 1 32
System-level characteristics
Corruption among top health sector management 1 45
Wide-spread corruption in the public sector 2 40,45
Health worker post rotations 1 44
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one Tanzanian study, most healthcare workers felt that infor-
mal payments were not allocated fairly42. In this case and 
in the absence of rules on how to share informal payments, 
healthcare workers especially lower cadres, bargained to increase 
their share of the informal payment by lowering the qual-
ity of care, for example by giving less attention to patients who 
had bribed doctors42.
Informal payments were common among healthcare work-
ers who received low32–34,37,40,45 and irregular salaries33,34,50 and 
less likely with increased health worker perception that benefits 
and entitlements were provided on time49. Healthcare work-
ers reported that their salaries were inadequate to meet their 
basic needs34,45 and for the level of effort and skill required of 
them34. Laypeople and health professionals in Togo found it 
more acceptable (M=4.89) for physicians to request infor-
mal payments when they were underpaid than when they were 
well paid (M=3.06)40. The latter is supported by FGD findings 
from Tanzania where healthcare workers reported that infor-
mal payments were a coping strategy for their low salaries and 
lack of allowances45. Some women in Angola also acknowl-
edged that the prolonged civil war which worsened everyone’s 
socioeconomic situation contributed to the charging of infor-
mal payments by midwives. However, some of the women 
also felt that their continued compliance with demands for 
informal payments perpetuated the practice33.
Despite complaints of low salaries, some healthcare work-
ers in Tanzania perceived charging of informal payments as a 
form of corruption42 which would damage their reputation and 
that of the health facility45. Some healthcare workers were also 
discouraged from charging informal payments because patients 
felt empowered to manipulate them after paying a bribe and 
this made healthcare workers feel humiliated and enslaved to 
patients52. This was in addition to some patients expecting to 
receive better treatment during subsequent visits42. In Kenya, 
healthcare providers acknowledged that charging informal 
payments was bad practice but some did not perceive infor-
mal payments as a challenge as long as the healthcare provider 
was willing to forgo the payment and offer health services 
if they discerned the patient did not have the ability to pay34. 
Healthcare providers were conflicted between meeting their 
basic needs for survival while also taking into account the 
financial hardship of the patients34.
Health facility characteristics. In terms of facility management, 
informal payments were more likely to be made at facilities 
that lacked official charging policies39,50 and oversight over 
healthcare workers behaviors’33, and where senior staff and facil-
ity managers were reported to be corrupt or to engage in charg-
ing of informal payments34,45. Informal charging was also more 
likely to take place at facilities with poor working conditions, 
staff45 and medicine shortages13, long waiting times31,37,48, facili-
ties that did not implement task shifting practices37, and urban 
facilities47,48. With regards to waiting times and task shifting 
practices (delegation of subsequent consultations from doc-
tors to nurses), patient survey data from Cameroon showed that 
patients seeking HIV care at facilities with long waiting times 
had a higher risk of paying informally (AOR 95% CI 3.68 
(1.27–10.68)) P ≤ 0.05 while task-shifting of HIV services reduced 
the risk of incurring informal payments (AOR 95% CI 0.31 
(0.11–0.90)) P ≤ 0.0537.
Informal payments were less likely to be made at facilities 
where patients paid official fees39,43, facilities with accountabil-
ity mechanisms for the user fees46, supervision throughout49 and 
where action was taken against corrupt practices32. The likeli-
hood of paying informally was also less at facilities with more 
staff46 and those reported to be well-managed41.
In terms of facility ownership, there were mixed findings on 
whether informal payments were more prevalent in the public or 
private sector. In Uganda, the prevalence (17%) and amount 
of bribes ($6.06) paid by individuals in the public health sec-
tor were higher than the prevalence (11%) and the amount paid 
($5.26) in the private sector (non-mission facilities)39. Simi-
larly, healthcare providers in Kenya reported that informal pay-
ments were more likely to occur in government facilities partly 
due to lower wages in the public sector and lower risk of fac-
ing consequences if found charging informal payments34. On 
the contrary, a survey done with PLWHA in Cameroon showed 
that the incidence and amount of informal payments charged 
in private for-profit facilities were higher than in both public 
hospitals and non-profit hospitals37.
There were mixed findings regarding informal payments across 
different levels of healthcare. For example, a patient survey done 
in Zambia found that informal payments were more common 
at public hospitals (9.7%) compared to public health centers 
(5.8%)48. On the other hand, in Tanzania, informal payments 
were higher at government dispensaries (84.6%) compared to 
government health centers (35.7%) and hospitals (30.0%)35. In 
terms of amount, surveys done in Nigeria36 and Zambia48 showed 
that informal payments for malaria treatment and primary 
health services respectively were higher in public hospitals com-
pared to healthcare centers. However, in Sierra Leone health-
care providers working in higher-level primary health care 
(PHC) facilities (community health centers and community 
health posts) received less income from gifts compared to those 
working in lower-level PHC facilities (maternal and child 
health posts)47.
System-level characteristics. Corruption in the public sector 
and staff transfers were reported to encourage the charging of 
informal payments. Some of the healthcare workers taking part 
in FGDs in Tanzania reported that corruption among officials 
at the top management level in the health sector and widespread 
corruption in the entire public sector promoted the charg-
ing of informal payments45. These findings are supported by a 
study done in Togo where laypeople and health workers found it 
more acceptable (M=4.47) for physicians to ask for informal 
payments when it was a common practice in other local public 
institutions than when the practice was rare (M=3.61)40. 
In terms of human resource management practices, FGDs in 
Sierra Leone showed that routine rotations of healthcare work-
ers across facilities led to an increase in charges with the new 
healthcare workers reintroducing charges for free health care44.
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Impact of informal payments on the quality of care
Informal payments were associated with negative patient 
experiences with health services31,39. For example, household 
survey data from Uganda showed that patients who paid infor-
mally were less likely to report that they were satisfied with the 
health services they received (AOR 0.27, 95% CI 0.24-0.29)31. 
Paying informally was associated with longer health facility vis-
its with patients and members of the public who used govern-
ment services and paid bribes reporting having spent more time 
to get the services needed (AOR, 2.04, 95% CI 1.89-2.22)31. 
In Tanzania, direct observation of healthcare workers during 
consultation showed that those who had a higher probability of 
accepting informal payments put in less effort for patients who 
were classified as weak in comparison to other healthcare 
workers. This indicated that they did not vary their effort 
based on the patient’s medical condition and therefore did not 
provide care based on patients’ needs41.
In terms of safety, in Tanzania, FGDs with healthcare work-
ers revealed that some of their colleagues deliberately pro-
longed waiting times for surgeries. This was aimed at making 
patients desire to pay for quicker services at the public facil-
ity or the doctor’s private practice42. Such delays could poten-
tially put the patient’s life at risk. Furthermore, some healthcare 
workers claimed that some of their colleagues provided very 
low-quality care, first, to hint to the patients that the quality of 
care would be very low if they did not give informal payments; 
and secondly when they felt that there was an unfair allocation 
of informal payments42.
In some Tanzanian health facilities, the provision of high-
quality services was perceived to have resulted from having 
received informal payments. This could have forced non-corrupt 
healthcare workers to lower the quality of care to protect 
themselves from being labeled as corrupt42.
Impact of informal payments on equity
Demands and actual payment of informal fees dispropor-
tionately affect the poor according to rounds 3 and 5 of the 
Afrobarometer survey13. Informal payments perpetuated health 
inequities in access to care. Qualitative findings from Uganda, 
Angola, and Kenya showed that some people were forced to 
delay34 or forgo care because they could not afford to pay infor-
mal payments33,43, leading to unintended consequences such 
as unwanted pregnancies34. Informal payments also prevented 
access to specialized services at public hospitals in urban 
areas in Tanzania45. The high prevalence of informal charges 
at dispensaries in a rural district in Tanzania was also thought 
to contribute to low facility delivery rates (40%)35.
Respectful service delivery was dependent on an individual’s 
ability to pay informally33,43. For example, community members 
in Uganda reported that the inability to pay informal payments 
led to healthcare workers being reluctant and impolite43 while 
in Angola it led to negligence or denial of care and in extreme 
cases obtaining “labor on credit” by pledging to pay later33. 
In Uganda, the ability to pay informally led to obtaining coop-
eration from healthcare workers43 and getting “royal treatment” 
in Angola33.
In some instances, informal payments led to the development 
of negative attitudes towards healthcare workers. For example, 
FGD participants in South Africa and Uganda reported feeling 
angry31 while women in Angola reported feeling anxious when 
healthcare workers demanded informal payments33. Health-
care workers in Kenya reported that informal payments could 
demoralize patients, especially where they incur costs for serv-
ices they are aware should be provided for free34. Being cog-
nizant that informal payments were an access barrier to the 
poor, some healthcare workers in Tanzania and DRC reported 
feeling uncomfortable charging informal fees45,46.
Discussion
Several studies ranging from large-scale nationally representa-
tive surveys to in-depth qualitative studies have shown that 
informal payments for healthcare are a common phenomenon in 
SSA regardless of the health service, facility level, and sec-
tor. Informal payments have also been reported to be prevalent 
in other regions such as Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, and 
South America10,12,21.
Informal payments limited access with the inability to pay asso-
ciated with disrespectful care33,43, delayed care-seeking34, and 
foregone care33,43. Informal payments also incentivized some 
healthcare providers to lower their quality of care to induce 
patients to pay informally to receive better services42. The nega-
tive impact is of particular concern especially for the poor 
because they bear the greatest burden of informal payments13. 
Evidence from both low and high-income countries shows 
that informal payments are inequitable and regressive53. They 
have been reported to lead to delayed hospitalization, use of 
savings, borrowing, and sale of assets to acquire resources to 
pay informally in countries such as Tajikistan, Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania53–55.
Mostly, healthcare workers rather than the patients initiated 
informal payments13,31,32,43,51. Patients paid informally, before 
care, mainly to access drugs and services, many of which 
should have been provided for free32–34,42,48,51. Some patients 
also made informal payments after service delivery as gifts 
to express gratitude42,50. Most informal payments were made 
in cash33,36–39,42,43,45 rather than kind33,38,46,47. It has been argued 
that it is difficult to differentiate voluntary gifts from solicited 
payments in the health sector. This is compounded by the fact 
that some patients may offer gifts out of fear of not receiving 
good healthcare services8.
From the demand side, low socio-economic status13 and lack 
of awareness of user fees32,34,46 were some of the key charac-
teristics associated with a higher likelihood of paying informal 
payments. Other than a socio-economic disadvantage, inequi-
ties in informal payments in most African countries have been 
attributed to disparities in supply-side factors, such as lack 
of drugs, long waiting times, shortage of doctors, and regional 
differences within countries that disadvantage the poor forc-
ing them to make informal payments to obtain better 
quality care13.
Some of the notable supply-side factors that increased the 
likelihood of paying informally were low healthcare worker 
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salaries32–34,37,40,45,49,50, absence of official fees39,50, and percep-
tions of widespread corruption in the public sector40,45. Low and 
irregular healthcare worker salaries could be associated with low 
government spending on health. For example, per capita, gov-
ernment health expenditure was very low in countries with 
the highest prevalence of informal payments, Sierra Leone 
($23), Liberia ($11), and DRC ($7) compared to countries with 
a low prevalence of informal payments, Botswana ($564) and 
Eswatini ($427)56. Low healthcare worker salaries have also 
been linked with the charging of informal payments in transi-
tion countries such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and 
Georgia due to economic difficulties that led to reduced gov-
ernment spending on health8,57–59. Informal payments were less 
likely at health facilities where patients paid official fees39,43. 
Similar findings have been reported in transition countries such 
as Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, and the Kyrgyz Republic where 
informal payments reduced following the introduction of co-
payments alongside other initiatives14,60,61. However, user fees 
reduce the utilization of health services especially among the 
poor62,63, and therefore formalization of user fees in SSA 
would also require the implementation of effective exemp-
tion policies for the poor and other vulnerable groups64. The 
effectiveness of formalization of user fees in reducing infor-
mal payments also warrants further investigation since the 
effects were not sustained in some transition countries such as 
Kyrgyzstan61.
This review identifies some distinctive features of infor-
mal payments in SSA. First, regional differences observed in 
the occurrence of informal payments can partly be associated 
with variation in the level of perceived corruption in the pub-
lic sector. In countries with the highest prevalence of informal 
payments, a higher proportion of households reported paying 
a bribe to use public services compared to countries with the 
lowest prevalence20. Secondly, the presence of political insta-
bility appeared to contribute to the variation in the preva-
lence of informal payments in SSA. Countries with the highest 
prevalence of informal payments, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
DRC had also faced political instability in recent years. Con-
stant conflict and insecurity in DRC have been linked with 
underfunding of public services and this might have encour-
aged informal charging20. Third, two qualitative studies revealed 
the existence of informal social networks that promote infor-
mal charging among and across cadres. Informal social 
networks have been linked to the development of strong moral 
obligations such as expectations to assist others within the net-
work and to return favors that may surpass any existing formal 
rules65. If left unchecked informal social networks among 
healthcare workers may continue to promote the charging of 
informal payments.
Limitations
This review had some limitations. One, the literature search 
was limited to studies published in English. Secondly, due to 
the vast nature of grey literature, some insights on informal 
payments in SSA might have been missed. Thirdly, these find-
ings can only be applied to similar low and middle-income coun-
tries with caution since factors affecting informal payments 
vary across contexts.
Some gaps were identified in the literature. There was lim-
ited information on the amount of informal payments incurred, 
variations in informal payments across various levels of care, 
and strategies used to tackle informal payments and their 
effectiveness. These are all potential areas for future research. 
There is also a need for further investigation on informal 
payments across all SSA regions because of the changes in 
health financing as countries strive to achieve UHC.
Policy considerations
Curbing informal payments calls for a multi-faceted approach 
with various short and long-term strategies because individual 
strategies alone cannot address the complexity of associ-
ated factors. Drivers of informal payments highlighted in this 
review provide some suggestions that policymakers in SSA 
could take into consideration and monitor to assess their effec-
tiveness. In the short term, there is a need to enhance public 
awareness about official user fees, and services and population 
groups that are exempt from user fees. Accountability mecha-
nisms at health facilities should also be strengthened. This could 
entail the establishment of safe and effective whistle-blower 
mechanisms for patients to report informal payment incidences 
and enhanced supportive supervision of health facilities. SSA 
governments should also increase their political commitment 
to fighting corruption in the health sector. In the medium to 
long term, there is a need for better remuneration for healthcare 
workers. This should be implemented alongside alternative 
incentive programs such as the provision of bonuses, better 
working conditions, and opportunities for career advancement. 
Increased government spending on health is also crucial 
as this would address healthcare worker shortages, poor 
working conditions, and drug stock-outs which were reported 
among the factors that encouraged informal payments. 
Equitable geographical distribution of health resources should 
also be ensured.
Conclusions
Informal payments are a common phenomenon in SSA, and the 
highest prevalence was reported in conflict and post-conflict 
countries and countries where corruption was perceived 
to be widespread in the public sector. Various patient and 
supply-side factors were associated with informal payments. 
Patients paid informally mainly to access services and drugs 
which were supposed to be provided for free. There was 
little evidence to suggest that paying informal payments led to 
the provision of higher quality care. Informal payments limited 
access and utilization of care especially among the poor and the 
inability to pay led to the provision of lower-quality care.
Some of the potential strategies that policymakers can consider 
when developing interventions to address informal payments 
include enhancing patient awareness about service fees, revis-
iting health worker incentive schemes, strengthening account-




All data underlying the results are available as part of the 
article and no additional source data are required.
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Extended data
Harvard Dataverse: The hidden financial burden of healthcare: a 
systematic literature review of informal payments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NMQCSF22.
This project contains the following extended data:
-    Characteristics of studies included in the review_table.docx
-    DataReadme_Kabia_et_al_review.txt
-    Search_strategy.docx
Reporting guidelines
Harvard Dataverse: PRISMA checklist for ‘The hidden finan-
cial burden of healthcare: a systematic literature review of 
informal payments in Sub-Saharan Africa’. https://doi.org/10.7910/
DVN/NMQCSF22.
Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International license (CC-BY 4.0).
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